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NOTE
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS V. PRO SE
DEFENDANTS: DOES WASHINGTON'S
PROPOSED LEGISLATION SUFFICIENTLY
PROTECT BOTH SIDES?
Linda Mohammadian*
Although most states have enacted statutes to protect child sexual
assault victims from the trauma associated with testifying before their
alleged attackers, no state, as of yet, has passed an equivalent statute for
adult victims. Washington, however, may be the first state to do so.
Washington's legislature has proposed a unique bill to protect all sexual
assault victims, be they children or adults, in sexual assault cases where
defendants choose to enact their Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation.
Washington's proposed legislation offers two significant remedies
for assault victims: court-appointed standby counsel and the use of
closed-circuit television. Both proposals raise questions concerning
their constitutionality in light of the Sixth Amendment rights to self-rep-
resentation and confrontation.
This Note suggests that although the proposed legislation limits
both Sixth Amendment rights, it can do so due to public policy concerns
of preventing sexual assault victims from suffering further psychological
harm. Furthermore, both proposed remedies limit the restrictions on the
defendant's rights. The proposed legislation therefore provides a bal-
ance between concern for the alleged victims and the rights of
defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to
self-representation and the right to confront their accuser.' These rights,
however, are not absolute2 and must be weighed against prevailing pub-
lic policy concerns. Such concerns are especially prevalent during the
cross-examination of sexual assault victims; victims of such crimes al-
ready suffer psychological harm when compelled to retell their exper-
iences in an open courtroom, but being questioned by their alleged
attacker places an additional burden on victims that may prevent them
from testifying. 3 Given these concerns, Washington has proposed legis-
lation that seeks to advance the public policy goals of minimizing trauma
1 U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
2 The United States Supreme Court has found instances where the need to ascertain the
truth, maintain order in the courtroom, or prevent the harassment of witnesses outweigh a
defendant's right to self-representation. See discussion infra Part I.B. Likewise, strong public
policy concerns have spurred the Court to limit a defendant's right to cross-examination under
the Confrontation Clause. See discussion infra Part I.C.
3 Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. Ruiv. 1353, 1412 (2005).
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to victims, encouraging future reporting of crime, and maintaining a de-
fendant's Constitutional rights. 4
Throughout judicial proceedings there is an ever-present struggle
between honoring a defendant's rights and protecting the public. The
United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has recognized the effec-
tiveness of the right of confrontation in ensuring that accusers will testify
truthfully,5 yet the Court has also acknowledged that this right may be
limited in order to protect special victims. 6 This need for limiting a de-
fendant's rights becomes even more prevalent when defendants waive
their right to counsel in order to represent themselves. Although cross-
examination allows defendants to confront their accusers, it also causes
"revictimization" because it requires the victim to relive the event.7 To
be questioned by one's assailant further exacerbates the stress of cross-
examination for victims.8 Furthermore, the percentage of victims who
report their assaults is minimal.9 Add the possibility that their alleged
attacker may question them, and victims are even less likely to come
forward than they would be otherwise. 10
In January 2011, a King County, Washington court convicted Salva-
dor Cruz of sexually assaulting at least five children, now adults, and
sentenced him to fifty-three years in prison." At trial, Cruz elected to
exercise his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself and to confront
his accusers via cross-examination.12 Although four of his victims took
the stand during trial, one woman refused to do So.13 Instead, she paced
the rooftops of the courthouse for hours, contemplating suicide in order
to avoid being cross-examined by her attacker. 14 In light of this event,
the Washington legislature proposed House Bill 1001 to place restric-
4 See H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (reintroduced in the House on April
26, 2011).
5 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
6 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844-45 (1990).
7 See generally State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tenn. 1997) ("It has been said that
the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice-once by the offender and once by the
criminal justice system."); Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and
Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 914, 955-56 (1994) (decrying
the character assassination by defense attorneys in rape trials).
8 See Lininger, supra note 3, at 1412.
9 See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTicE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, tbl. 1, at 2 (2011).
10 See Lininger, supra note 3, at 1412.
II Levi Pulkkinen, Rapist Sentenced in Case That Prompted Witness Suicide Attempt,
SEATTFLE POST- INTEI LtGENCER (Jan. 20, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/arti-
cle/Rapist-sentenced-in-case-that-prompted-witness-97074 1.php.
12 See id.
13 See Jennifer Sullivan, Rape Victim's Threat to Jump Off Courthouse Roof May Derail
Case, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 4, 2010, 9:14 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2013350378trial05m.html.
14 See id.
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tions on pro se defendants questioning their alleged sexual assault vic-
tims.15 This was not, in fact, the first time that Washington had proposed
such legislation.16 A year before Cruz, another defendant also chose to
represent himself and, in so doing, abused his cross-examination power
by badgering the alleged victim.' 7 However, before the Senate had a
chance to vote on the proposed legislation and before the jury reached a
verdict, the defendant committed suicide, and the Washington legislature
abandoned the bill.' 8
The current bill before the Washington legislature proposes that, in
instances where a defendant waives his right to counsel and instead opts
to represent himself, restrictions can be placed on how the defendant
questions the victim.19 Should the court find that the victim would suffer
serious emotional distress, thereby preventing her from reasonably com-
municating at trial if questioned directly by the defendant, the court may
enact reasonable procedures to protect the victim. 2 0 This may include
having someone else ask the defendant's cross-examination questions or
utilizing remote audio-video questioning.21 If such measures are taken,
the court must instruct the jury that it cannot draw inferences about the
defendant's guilt or innocence based on the procedure used to question
the alleged victim. 2 2
No other state, thus far, has passed a statute that would directly ad-
dress these issues. Courts, however, have on occasion exercised their
discretion by allowing special victims to be questioned by a pro se defen-
dant's standby counsel via closed-circuit television. 23 The majority of
such cases, however, involve child victims, as they are often perceived as
more susceptible to extreme stress under such situations. 24 Washington's
proposed legislation, however, not only protects children, but also adult
victims of sexual assault.25 Thus, the bill effectively upholds the policy
goal of protecting all sexual assault victims, yet it does so in a manner
that could potentially deprive defendants of their rights.
This Note argues that the proposed Washington legislation and its
remedies are constitutional and will not greatly interfere with a defen-
dant's rights of self-representation and confrontation. Part I of this Note
will examine a defendant's right to self-representation. Part II will ana-
15 Pulkkinen, supra note 11.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 Id.
19 H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., State v. Folk, 256 P.3d 735, 744-45 (Idaho 2011).
24 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990).
25 See H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
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lyze the Confrontation Clause and acceptable limitations to cross-exami-
nation. Finally, Part III will address the rationale behind the proposed
Washington statute, the public policy concerns, the constitutionality of
the statute, and the potential effects that the proposed remedies may have
on jurors' perceptions of both defendants and victims.
I. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. Origin of the Right to Self-Representation
The right to self-representation "finds support in the structure of the
Sixth Amendment," as established by the Supreme Court in Faretta v.
California.26 The Sixth Amendment specifically provides that:
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence [sic]. 2 7
Not only does the Sixth Amendment entitle the defendant to a defense,
but it also "grants to the accused personally the right to make his de-
fense." 28 Thus, while not explicitly stated in the Sixth Amendment, the
Amendment's structure implies the right to self-representation. 29
Although in most criminal prosecutions the defendant would benefit
from the assistance of counsel, it is the defendant who bears the conse-
quences of a conviction, not his attorney.30 As the Faretta Court rea-
soned, "[t]he right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he
who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."31 In order to proceed
pro se, a defendant must relinquish a number of benefits associated with
the right to counsel, and so the Court requires that the defendant know-
ingly and intelligently waive these benefits. 32 Although the Sixth
Amendment grants defendants the right to self-representation, this right
is not absolute.33
26 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (holding that a defendant is entitled to proceed pro se so
long as he knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel because the right to self-
representation is implicit in the Sixth Amendment).
27 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
28 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
29 See id. at 819-20.
30 See id. at 834.
31 Id. at 820.
32 See id. at 835.
33 See United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the trial
judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the defendant his right to self-representation
where the defendant deliberately engaged in obstructionist conduct by refusing to answer the
court's questions).
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B. Limitations on the Right to Self-Representation
Courts have provided numerous reasons for limiting one's right to
self-representation. One common reason courts refuse a defendant's re-
quest to proceed pro se is because the defendant did not timely assert the
right.3 4 A judge can also limit self-representation if a pro se defendant
acts in an obstructive or disruptive manner during trial.35 In some in-
stances, a defendant may choose to represent himself in order to disrupt
his own trial. 36 In fact, some defendants may choose to proceed pro se in
order to torment their victims.3 7 Whenever a defendant deliberately acts
in a manner to compromise a court's ability to conduct a fair trial, "the
defendant's self-representation rights are subject to forfeiture." 38 As
such, when a defendant chooses to cross-examine his alleged victim in
order to torment her, the court is unable to conduct a fair trial, and the
defendant's self-representation rights are subject to forfeiture. Therefore,
it is evident that self-representation rights can be limited, especially in
instances where a defendant's own conduct undermines the efficiency of
the justice system.
While some defendants may opt to proceed pro se simply to intimi-
date their alleged victims, that is not true of all defendants. 39 Even if a
defendant does not intend to disrupt the trial, however, the courts are still
permitted to appoint standby counsel to assist the pro se defendant.40
Although "[t]he pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organi-
zation and content of his own defense,"4 1 a trial judge may appoint coun-
sel, over a defendant's objections, in order to "relieve the judge of the
need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist
the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of
the defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated goals."42 In
addition, because of their unfamiliarity with cross-examination, pro se
34 See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 498 (1st Cir. 1997); Sapienza v. Vin-
cent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976).
35 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (holding that it is within a trial judge's
discretion to terminate a defendant's right to self-representation when he engages in disruptive
conduct during trial).
36 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
37 See Lininger, supra note 3, at 1412.
38 Alanna Clair, "An Opportunity for Effective Cross-Examination": Limits on the Con-
frontation Right of the Pro Se Defendant, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 719, 723 (2009).
39 Some defendants choose to represent themselves because they believe that their attor-
ney is incompetent, that they can do a better job representing themselves, that lawyers are part
of an overall oppressive system; and some defendants represent themselves so that they can
have access to a jail's law library. See Does Self-Representation in a Criminal Case Ever
Make Sense?, Not-o, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/does-self-representation-crimi-
nal-case-29971.htmil (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
40 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984).
41 Id. at 174.
42 Id. at 184.
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defendants may unknowingly badger vulnerable witnesses, so courts may
appoint standby counsel to avoid such harms. 43
To ensure that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-repre-
sentation is not violated by the presence of court-appointed standby
counsel, courts must consider two factors."4 First, the pro se defendant
must maintain "actual control over the case he chooses to present to the
jury."4 5 Second, the participation of court-appointed standby counsel
cannot "destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing
himself."4 6 Court-appointed standby counsel may, however, "steer a de-
fendant through the basic procedures of trial . . . even in the unlikely
event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's appearance of
control over his own defense." 4 7
Furthermore, the presence of court-appointed standby counsel en-
sures not only the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representa-
tion but also his right to confrontation. The presence of court-appointed
standby counsel can thus be especially effective when pro se defendants
cross-examine their alleged sexual assault victims. Although Washing-
ton's proposed legislation does not explicitly call for the appointment of
standby counsel when pro se defendants cross-examine their alleged sex-
ual assault victims, the proposed legislation does call for a court-ap-
proved individual to cross-examine the victim by using questions
prepared by the defendant.48 This Note therefore argues that, at least for
purposes of cross-examination of sexual assault victims, courts should
appoint standby counsel in order to uphold the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights to both self-representation and, as discussed in Part II infra,
confrontation.
I. THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
A. The History of the Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." 49 The right of an accused to confront the wit-
nesses against him applies not only in federal court but also in state court
43 See Christopher G. Frey, The State v. the Self-Represented: A Florida Prosecutor's
Concerns When Litigating Against a Pro Se Defendant in a Criminal Trial, 29 STETSON L.
REV. 181, 191 (1999).
44 See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 184.
48 See H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
49 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Included in this right to confront
witnesses is the right to cross-examination. 51
The right to confront one's accusers dates back to the Romans. 52
The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in the sixteenth century, however, re-
mains one of the pivotal cases in Confrontation Clause history.53 During
his trial, Raleigh objected to the admission of an alleged co-conspirator's
confession where Raleigh had no opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness, but his objection was overruled. 54 Following the trial, English law
underwent a series of reforms to limit such abuses, thus developing the
right to confrontation.55
B. The Importance of Cross-Examination in the Right to
Confrontation
That the right to confrontation appears in the Bill of Rights indicates
that it is a fundamental right that is essential to a fair trial.5 6 Many courts
are reluctant to hinder the confrontation right because it is considered
"[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty."57 Indeed, the
Supreme Court is a strong advocate for the protection and expansion of
the scope of the Confrontation Clause to ensure that the right to confront
one's accusers remains protected.58 Although the Court has not explored
all aspects of the Confrontation Clause, it is understood that a defendant
should be present during all witness testimonies given in open court, sub-
ject to cross-examination. 59 In addition to serving as the primary method
by which confrontation is satisfied, cross-examination also promotes ac-
curate fact-finding. 60
Cross-examination is the "functional purpose" of the Confrontation
Clause,6' and, as Justice Scalia noted in Crawford v. Washington, it is the
best tool for testing the veracity of witnesses. 62 In fact, a defendant's
50 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
51 Id. at 404.
52 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-49 (2004) (discussing the history of the
Confrontation Clause through Roman, early English, and colonial times).
53 See id. at 44. Charged with treason on the basis of an alleged accomplice's confes-
sion, Sir Walter Raleigh repeatedly demanded to confront his accuser in court, but the judge
refused. The jury subsequently convicted Raleigh and sentenced him to death. See id.
54 See id.
55 Id.
56 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
57 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
58 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
59 See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 247 (2002).
60 See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
61 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987).
62 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 (quoting MATTIHEw HALE, HISTORY AND) ANALYSIS OF
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 258 (1713)).
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right to confront witnesses against him includes the right to cross-ex-
amine those witnesses. 6 3 Cross-examining adverse witnesses is crucial
to maintaining the fundamental fairness of the criminal justice system.64
Ultimately, "the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a
practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials." 65
C. Rationale for Limitations to the Right to Confrontation
The right to confrontation is not absolute. 66 A defendant has the
right to full cross-examination, and, thus, restrictions to cross-examina-
tion should be considered in light of this right.67 Although cross-exami-
nation "forms 'the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause,"' the Supreme Court has never recognized it as indispensible to
the confrontation right. 68 As such, courts have the discretion to limit
cross-examination so long as the restriction does not interfere with a de-
fendant's right to confrontation. 6 9 This discretion is evident in both the
Federal Rules of Evidence and case law.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[tihe court should exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for the
ascertainment of the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect wit-
nesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."70 This rule thereby
grants judges the authority to control the method of cross-examination
while also ensuring that the defendant retains his right to confrontation.
Furthermore, Rule 611 (a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests a
public policy concern of protecting witnesses from potential harassment
during confrontation.71
Although the Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa held that face-to-face
confrontation between the accused and the accuser is "essential to a fair
trial in a criminal prosecution," 7 2 the Court in Maryland v. Craig specifi-
63 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
64 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
65 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
66 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844, 853 (1990) (holding that the state's interest
in protecting the psychological well-being of a child abuse victim was sufficiently important to
outweigh a defendant's right to face his accuser in court).
67 See United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1016 n.5 (5th Cir. 1974).
68 Craig, 497 U.S. at 847 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970)).
69 United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1581 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 876 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1166 (1985)).
70 FED. R. Evil). 611(a).
71 See FEi). R. Evin. 611 (a)(3).
72 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965))
(holding that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated because a screen was placed
between him and the child victim that blocked the defendant from the child's sight).
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cally limited the scope of the method of confrontation in order to uphold
the public policy goal of reducing trauma to vulnerable witnesses.73 The
critical inquiry, therefore, is whether limiting confrontation is necessary
to further an important state interest. 74 Supreme Court precedent estab-
lishes that, while the Confrontation Clause promotes the use of cross-
examination, the right to confrontation must sometimes give way to pub-
lic policy considerations.75
"The limitations on a defendant's strict constitutional right to con-
front his accusers are most often justified by the court's desire to ensure
truthful and unencumbered testimony." 76 According to the American
Psychological Association's amicus brief in support of limiting cross-
examination in Maryland v. Craig, "[r]equiring child witnesses to un-
dergo face-to-face confrontation . . . may in some cases actually disserve
the truth-seeking rationale that underlies the Confrontation Clause."77
D. Methods of Limiting Confrontation
1. One-Way Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
The Supreme Court has upheld a state statute allowing the use of a
one-way CCTV when the testimony given over the circuit is by an al-
leged child abuse victim. 78 "To invoke the procedure, the trial judge
must first 'determin[e] that testimony by the child victim in the court-
room will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate.'" 7 9 Once the trial judge in-
vokes this procedure, the prosecutor and defense counsel may examine
and cross-examine the child in a separate room while those in the court-
room observe the testimony via a video monitor.80 Although the child
73 Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
74 Id. at 852.
75 Id. at 849 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
76 Clair, supra note 38, at 732.
77 See Gail S. Goodman et al., Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The Amer-
ican Psychological Association Brief in Maryland v. Craig, 15 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 13, 18
(1991).
78 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860; see also Fuster-Escalona v. Fla. Dep't. of Corr., 170 F.
App'x 627, 629 (1Ith Cir. 2006) (allowing four children to testify via two-way CCTV at
defendant's trial for sexual battery where the witnesses could see the defendant on a monitor in
the judge's chambers and witnesses were contemporaneously cross-examined by the defense
attorney); State v. Smith, 730 A.2d 311, 317 (N.J. 1999) (finding CCTV testimony appropriate
when a face-to-face confrontation may overwhelm the child, thereby preventing effective testi-
mony and undermining the truth-finding function of the trial); Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577,
580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (affirming a child victim's ability to testify via two-way
CCTV where district court found it would protect victims from further trauma).
79 Craig, 497 U.S. at 841 (quoting Mo. CoDo ANN., CTS. & Jun. PRoc. § 9-102 (Lexis-
Nexis 1989)).
80 Id.
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cannot see the defendant, the defendant can see the child and may com-
municate with his counsel in order to make objections.81
Although a one-way CCTV prevents the defendant from facing his
accuser, it preserves the other elements of the confrontation right, namely
that "[t]he child witness must be competent to testify and must testify
under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous
cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view
(albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he
or she testifies." 82 Furthermore, the state has a substantial interest in
protecting child victims of abuse from the trauma of testifying.83 The
Supreme Court, however, has not yet addressed whether the use of a one-
way CCTV for adult victims of sexual assault is constitutional.
2. One-Way Glass
Although the use of CCTV may be acceptable under certain circum-
stances, some state courts have held that the use of one-way glass during
an adult victim's testimony violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation. 8 4 In such instances, the glass prevents the victim
from seeing the defendant, although the jury and defendant may still ob-
serve the victim's demeanor.85
In People v. Murphy, a California appellate court reiterated that to
deny a defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation, all other ele-
ments of the right of confrontation must be preserved: i.e., the witness
must testify under oath, there must be an opportunity for contemporane-
ous cross-examination, and the defendant and trier of fact must have an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness while she testifies.86
Although the court found that one-way glass preserved these elements,"
it did not uphold the use of one-way glass because the prosecution did
not provide any authority indicating that there was a compelling interest
in protecting adult victims of sex crimes, and the trial court did not hold
an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of the anxiety of the vic-
tim.88 As such, it is possible that if there had been a proper inquiry into
the psychological well-being of the victim, the court may have allowed
81 Id. at 841-42.
82 Id. at 851.
83 Id. at 852.
84 See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 694 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2003).
85 Id. at 689.
86 Id. at 692 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 851).
87 Id. (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-52)
88 Id. at 693-94.
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the use of one-way glass in this context, though the court recognized that
one-way glass might raise due process concerns.89
3. Witness Testifies in Courtroom But Out of Defendant's Sight
In Lucas v. McBride, a child sexual assault victim was present in the
courtroom during cross-examination, but the child was positioned so that
she did not have to look directly at the defendant.90 The court held that
this did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation. 9 1
While face-to-face confrontation ensures reliability and reduces the
risk of a witness implicating an innocent person,92 "the Confrontation
Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair
opportunity to probe and expose testimonial infirmities [such as forget-
fulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby call-
ing to the attention of the factfinder [sic] the reasons for giving scant
weight to the witness' testimony."93
III. WASHINGTON'S PROPOSED LEGISLATION PROTECTING SEXUAL
ASSAULT VICTIMS
A. Concerns of Sexual Assault Victims and Public Policy
According to a survey completed by the Department of Justice,
there were approximately 188,380 sexual assaults in 2010.94 What is
more staggering, however, is that the Department estimates that fewer
than 50% of sexual assaults are actually reported, making sexual assault
one of the most underreported crimes. 95
Victims often do not report sexual assaults because of the trauma
associated with pursuing a complaint and the inherent difficulties in con-
victing assailants. 96 Another reason that women decide not to report rape
is their fear of the legal system.97 This fear is due to the psychological
distress experienced by victims, as "rape is without question one of the
most terrifying crimes in which the victim survives . . . . [I]ts conse-
quences remain with the victim for many years or perhaps a lifetime,
89 Id. at 694. The Court chose not to address the due process question and instead came
to their decision by analyzing the right of confrontation. Id.
90 505 F. Supp. 2d 329, 353 (N.D. W. Va. 2007).
91 Id.
92 Id. (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 845).
93 Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)).
94 JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, supra note 9, tbl. 1, at 2 (2011).
95 See id. tbl. 7, at 10; LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NATIONAL CRIME VICIM-
IZATfION SURVEY, VienMIZATIONs Nor REPORTED TO THE PoLci, 2006-2010, at 4 (2012).
96 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.i. 1087, 1162 (1986).
97 Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer, Note, Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult
Rape Victims Be Permitted to Testify by Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 INIo. L.J. 797, 810
(1992).
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accounting for deep psychological problems." 98 Often these victims ex-
perience "fear, anger, and anxiety" that last for several years.99 Sexual
assault victims, therefore, fear the legal system because the trial often
forces the victims, who may already suffer from psychological trauma, to
relive the experience of the attack.'"' These concerns become more pro-
nounced when the alleged assailant questions the victim.' 0 In addition,
such trials tend to focus more on the victim rather than the defendant
because there are rarely any witnesses to the alleged assault and consent
is a key issue.0 2 As such, victims fear an attack on their character by
defense counsel.
Due to these fears and concerns, many victims do not report their
sexual assaults. To address this issue, Congress created the Rape Shield
laws.103 The principal sponsor of this Federal Rule of Evidence noted
that "[s]ince rape trials become inquisitions into the victim's morality,
not trials of the defendant's innocence or guilt, it is not surprising that it
is the least reported crime. It is estimated that as few as one in ten rapes
is ever reported."lO4 The Rape Shield laws have withstood constitutional
scrutiny,105 suggesting that the purpose of these laws (i.e., to protect sex-
ual assault victims from further embarrassment and to promote reporting
of attacks) are sufficiently important to public policy to outweigh the
Sixth Amendment rights that may be violated by excluding evidence
under such laws. It is these public policy concerns for minimizing
trauma to sexual assault victims and encouraging reporting of such
crimes that underlie Washington's proposed legislation limiting the con-
frontation rights of pro se defendants.
98 Id. (citing Edward Sagarin, Forcible Rape and the Problem of the Rights of the Ac-
cused, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VIcTIM, AND THE OFFENDER 142 (Duncan Chap-
pell, Robley Geis & Gilbert Geis eds. 1977)) (alterations in original); see also J. BARKAS,
VICTIMS 98 (1978) ("Except for murder, the crime of rape is the ultimate invasion, the one
with the most severe physical and psychological consequences for its victim.").
99 Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syn-
drome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395,
425-26 (1985). Rape Trauma Syndrome is defined as "the acute phase and long-term reorgan-
ization process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape." Id. at 425
n. 127.
100 See Thielmeyer, supra note 97, at 811.
101 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 13 (discussing an adult sexual assault victim who con-
templated taking her own life in order to avoid having her alleged attacker cross-examine her
in court); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) (discussing how child victims suffer
additional trauma when forced to testify in court in front of their alleged attacker).
102 See Thielmcyer, supra note 97, at 811.
103 See FED. R. EvID. 412.
104 124 Cong. Rec. H34913 (1978).
105 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 n.9 (4th Cir. 1981).
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B. Constitutionality of and Rationale for Washington's Proposed
Legislation
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court held that the right to face-
to-face confrontation is not absolute in light of important public policy
considerations.10 6 As such, whether adult sexual assault victims who
would be emotionally traumatized by being cross-examined by their al-
leged attacker should be given the same protection as child victims de-
pends on whether protecting adult sexual assault victims is an important
public policy. 07
Following in the footsteps of Maryland's legislation, 08 Washing-
ton's proposed legislation delineates the steps and findings that must be
reached before a court can restrict a pro se defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights.' 09 Specifically, Washington's legislation would be relevant only
in criminal prosecution proceedings for sex offenses when the victim is
testifying and the defendant has waived his right to counsel." 0 In such
proceedings the prosecution may have the court hold a hearing outside
the presence of the jury to determine whether the victim would suffer
serious emotional or mental distress that would "prevent the victim from
reasonably communicating at the trial" if questioned by the defendant."'
Such procedures ensure that the court does not arbitrarily limit a defen-
dant's confrontation and self-representation rights, thereby addressing
Justice O'Connor's concerns in Coy v. Iowa that state interests not super-
sede a defendant's constitutional rights without a case-specific
finding.' 12
Furthermore, a defendant's right to self-representation is not in-
fringed so long as the defendant has a fair chance to present his case in
his own way and make his voice heard-a fact that Washington's legisla-
ture highlights in support of its proposed legislation." 3 As the legisla-
ture emphasizes, this right to self-representation is not absolute, as
evidenced by the ability of courts to appoint counsel in certain situa-
tions.' 14 Additionally, courts have been able to control the method of
cross-examination to ensure that the truth is ascertained and to protect a
witness from harassment and undue embarrassment." 5 As such, so long
106 497 U.S. at 853-54.
107 See Thielmeyer, supra note 97, at 809.
108 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 840-44; see also MD. Coon3 ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102
(West 1989) (current version at Mo. CoM ANN. CRIM. PROC § 11-303 (LexisNexis 2008)).
109 See H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
110 See id.
III Id.
112 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1i3 See H.B. 1001; see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
''4 See H.B. 1001; see also McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184.
115 H.B. 1001; see also Clair, supra note 38, at 723; FED. R. Evio. 611 (a)(3).
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as there is a strong state interest, the legislature's proposed bill limiting
the rights of pro se defendants to question their sexual assault victims is
constitutional.
Given the overwhelming data regarding the psychological harm that
sexual assault victims face not only during the assault itself but also in
having to relive it during trial, 116 it is evident that adult sexual assault
victims are just as much in need of protection as child victims. 1 17 Wash-
ington's legislature thus proposes that "the state has a compelling interest
in the physical and psychological well-being of victims of sex offenses,"
which outweighs a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation
and self-representation.'1 s Washington's legislature thereby provides a
specific state interest that it seeks to protect through its legislation and
requires a case-specific finding." 9 The proposed legislation therefore
withstands constitutional scrutiny.
C. Evaluation of Washington's Proposed Remedies
The Washington bill proposes two remedies in instances where a
defendant represents himself in a sexual assault case and the court finds
that the victim will suffer severe psychological harm if cross-examined
by the defendant. 12 0 One proposed remedy is that the court appoints
someone to cross-examine the victim on behalf of the defendant. 12 1 The
second proposal is that the defendant be allowed to question the victim
via "remote audio-video means."' 2 2 These proposed remedies, however,
raise potential concerns as to how they will influence jurors' perceptions
of the defendant and whether they may unfairly bias the jurors against
the defendant.
1. Implications of Using Court-Appointed Standby Counsel
Legally, as long as the defendant maintains "actual control over the
case" and the participation of court-appointed standby counsel does not
"destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself,"
then a court will find that the appointment of standby counsel has not
denied the defendant his right to represent himself.12 3 This legal basis,
however, fails to take into consideration the effect that the presence and
participation of court-appointed standby counsel can have on a juror's
perception of the guilt or innocence of a pro se defendant. Furthermore,
116 See supra Part III.A.
117 See Thielmeyer, supra note 97, at 813.
118 H.B. 1001.
119 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988).
120 See H.B. 1001.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
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the potential for a harmful impact on jurors' perceptions is augmented by
Washington's proposal that standby counsel be appointed to the defen-
dant only for the purpose of cross-examining the victim.1 2 4
To protect the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant, the court
must ensure that the defendant maintains control of his own defense, 125
which the proposed legislation attempts to do. The proposed legislation
specifically requires that the defendant be allowed to prepare all ques-
tions and follow-up questions asked by the court-appointed standby
counsel. 126 Furthermore, to ensure that the presence of counsel does not
"destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing him-
self,"1 27 the proposed legislation requires that if a court-appointed
standby counsel cross-examines the alleged victim, then the court must
explain to the jury that "the defendant is continuing to represent him-
self . . . and that the defendant composed the questions." 28 "The as-
sumption that jurors are able to follow the court's instructions fully
applies when rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause are at is-
sue." 29 As such, adequate instructions to the jury ensure that the jury
understands that the defendant is still representing himself despite the
presence of court-appointed standby counsel.
On its face, it appears that Washington's proposal to use court-ap-
pointed standby counsel to cross-examine sexual assault victims satisfies
both public policy and Sixth Amendment concerns. Although the victim
will still be in the presence of her alleged attacker, the potential for psy-
chological harm is greatly reduced by ensuring that the defendant cannot
cross-examine his alleged victim, thereby upholding public policy goals
of protecting sexual assault victims. On the other hand, the presence of
court-appointed standby counsel also ensures that the defendant's rights
to self-representation and confrontation are upheld. Since the jury is in-
structed that the defendant is still acting pro se despite the presence of
court-appointed standby counsel, and since the defendant continues to
maintain control over the case, the proposed legislation does not violate
the defendant's right to self-representation. The defendant is also still
able to confront his accuser under the proposed legislation because the
victim is still in the courtroom when testifying, she is under oath, the
judge, jury, and defendant can observe her demeanor while she testifies,
and the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the victim with
124 See H.B. 1001 (emphasis added).
125 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174.
126 H.B. 1001.
127 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
128 HB. 1001.
129 Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 n.6 (1985) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 735 (1969)).
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his own questions. 13 0 The only concern that remains is whether the pres-
ence of a court-appointed standby counsel, solely for cross-examination
of the alleged sexual assault victim, will affect how jurors perceive the
defendant's guilt or innocence.
There has not yet been any research specifically examining the ef-
fect that court-appointed standby counsel has on a jury's perception of a
defendant. One possible cause for concern is that jurors may perceive
the defendant as more likely to be guilty when they see that he has con-
ducted all aspects of the trial by himself, except for the cross-examina-
tion of the alleged victim. 13 1 The potential for such a negative effect on
jurors' perceptions raises the need for research to determine if this is a
cause for concern. Specifically, future research should examine how ju-
rors perceive pro se defendants without court-appointed standby counsel,
how they perceive the defendants when court-appointed standby counsel
is present, and how they perceive the defendants when court-appointed
standby counsel is required to take part in the trial by cross-examining an
alleged victim.
In addition to the effect that the presence of court-appointed standby
counsel has on jurors' perceptions, there is also the question of whether
the court should give jury instructions as to why court-appointed standby
counsel is present, and if so what those instructions should entail. Courts
in this situation often explain to the jury that the defendant has a right to
cross-examination but that someone else, either the judge or appointed
counsel, will be asking the defendant's questions.13 2
Washington's bill proposes a number of jury instructions. First, the
court must tell the jury that although someone else is cross-examining
the victim, the defendant composed the questions himself and is still act-
ing pro se.1 3 3 Furthermore, the judge must instruct the jurors that they
are "not to consider the court procedure for questioning the victim, nor to
draw any inference from the procedure, when evaluating the facts of the
case and the charges presented against the defendant." 3 4 These warn-
ings are similar to those given in State v. Estabrook, a case where the
defendant was required to submit his cross-examination questions to be
read by the judge.13 5 Ultimately, the Estabrook court found that the De-
130 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990).
131 See, e.g., Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1047 n.4 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting) (recogniz-
ing the potential prejudice against defendants involved in having someone other than the pro se
defendant cross-examine alleged victims).
132 See, e.g., State v. Estabrook, 842 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Wash. App. Div. 2 1993).
133 See H.B. 1001.
'34 Id.
135 See Estabrook, 842 P.2d at 1004. This case involved a defendant accused of taking
indecent liberties with a minor, and, in order to protect the child from further trauma, the court
read the defendant's questions to the child victim. Id.
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fendant's right to self-representation was not violated because he wrote
the questions and follow-up questions himself, and, although the judge
read the questions to the victim, the jury still perceived the defendant as
representing himself because of instructions given by the judge to that
effect.13 6
One potential concern with such jury warnings is that they may in-
fluence a juror's perception of a defendant. Specifically, such warnings
may draw further attention to the presence of court-appointed standby
counsel and to the fact that the court-appointed standby counsel is only
being used to cross-examine the alleged victim. The mere presence of
court-appointed standby counsel for cross-examination purposes already
raises potential cause for concern in biasing the jurors against the defen-
dant,' 37 and providing jury instructions on the matter may lead jurors to
have a more negative perception of the defendant by drawing their atten-
tion to that fact.
On the other hand, if the judge does not provide a jury instruction as
to why court-appointed standby counsel, as opposed to the defendant, is
cross-examining the victim, this may also negatively affect the jurors'
perceptions of the defendant. 38 Through the jury instruction, the judge
can remind the jurors that the defendant is the one who drafted the ques-
tions and clarify that the presence of court-appointed standby counsel is
in no way indicative of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Without such
instructions, it is possible that the jurors would draw their own assump-
tions as to why the defendant is not cross-examining the alleged victim,
and such assumptions may negatively skew jurors' perceptions.
Since there is so much uncertainty as to the role of jury instructions
in cases where court-appointed standby counsel plays a prominent role in
a trial, research needs to be done to determine exactly how jury instruc-
tions affect jurors and their perceptions of defendants. Furthermore,
studies need to be conducted to determine the appropriate content of such
instructions and the extent to which they remind jurors that defendants
are innocent until proven guilty. A mock jury study with multiple jury
instructions scenarios would likely reveal the effect of jury instructions
on a juror's perceptions of a defendant, and which type of instruction, if
any, is least likely to influence jury perception.
136 Id. at 1006.
137 See, e.g., Fields v. Murray 49 F.3d 1024, 1047 n.4 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting) (emphasiz-
ing the potential for prejudice when someone other than the pro se defendant cross-examines a
witness).
138 See, e.g., Estabrook, 842 P.2d at 1006 (holding that a judge could read the cross-
examination questions of a pro se defendant on his behalf, but emphasizing the importance of
the court giving jury instructions explaining why the court was conducting the cross-examina-
tion); Fields, 49 F.3d at 1047 n.4 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting) (recognizing the importance of jury
instructions to prevent juror bias).
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2. Implications of Using CCTV
If a court does not choose to provide a court-appointed standby
counsel, the proposed legislation allows a court to instead "impose rea-
sonable procedures upon the parties for conducting the questioning to
avoid trauma to [the] victim."1 3 9 Such procedures include preventing the
defendant from approaching the victim during questioning.140 The more
controversial alternative, however, is the use of audio-video means when
the defendant questions the victim,141 including the use of CCTV
testimony.14 2
"Proponents of CCTV reason that if children do not have to face the
defendant or enter the courtroom, [they] will be less traumatized by testi-
fying."1 4 3 On the other hand, opponents of CCTV contend that the use
of CCTV violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
because it impedes the jury's ability to assess the credibility of the child
witness.144 Defense attorneys further argue that the victim's lack of
presence in the courtroom may impact the jurors' perceptions of the de-
fendant.'45 They claim that the fact that the victim is not in the court-
room while she testifies potentially implicates the defendant's guilt due
to the jurors' perception that the victim is not present in the courtroom
because she is concerned about being in the same room as the defendant
and needs to be protected from him.14 6
a) Legal Issues of CCTV
The Supreme Court has held that CCTV testimony-one-way and
two-way-is constitutional as a means of protecting child victims as well
as ensuring a defendant's right to confrontation.14 7 "So long as a trial
court makes such a case-specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation
Clause does not prohibit a State from using a one-way closed-circuit tele-
vision procedure . . . ."148 Thus, CCTV testimony may be used with
139 H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
140 Id.
'41 Id.
142 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853-54 (1990). Thirty-seven states utilize vide-
otaped testimony of sexually abused children; twenty-four states use one-way CCTV testi-
mony; and eight states allow the use of a two-way CCTV testimony whereby the child witness
can see the courtroom, and those in the courtroom can see the child witness. Id.
143 Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Tech-
nology on Children's Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors' Decisions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
165, 166 (1998).
144 Id.
145 Natalie Taylor & Jacqueline Joudo, The Impact of Pre-Recorded Video and Closed
Circuit Television Testimony by Adult Sexual Assault Complainants on Jury Decision-Making:
An Experimental Study, 68 REs. & PuB. Po' Y SERIES 1, 5 (2005) [hereinafter CCTV Study].
146 Id.
147 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
148 Id. at 860.
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child assault victims because it can reduce the psychological harm to
children. 149 It therefore stands to reason that adult sexual assault victims
who will suffer severe emotional and mental distress from being ques-
tioned by their alleged attackers would also benefit from providing testi-
mony via CCTV.
The use of CCTV testimony also ensures that the defendant main-
tains his rights to confrontation and self-representation. The Court held
in Maryland v. Craig that a defendant's confrontation rights are not vio-
lated through the use of CCTV testimony because, although the defen-
dant cannot confront his accuser face-to-face, the victim is still under
oath, can be observed by those in the courtroom as to her demeanor, and
can be cross-examined. 50 Furthermore, the proposed legislation does
not prohibit the defendant from cross-examining the alleged victim when
she testifies by CCTV,15 1 thereby upholding and not limiting the defen-
dant's right to self-representation.
As such, the use of CCTV testimony with adult victims appears to
be constitutional in situations where the sexual assault victims would suf-
fer severe emotional or mental distress, as required by Washington's pro-
posed legislation. Under such conditions, the public policy concerns in
protecting adult sexual assault victims from further psychological harm
outweigh the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant. The use of CCTV
testimony does not completely negate a pro se defendant's rights, but
rather it merely limits his right to confrontation. As such, the Supreme
Court would likely find the use of CCTV to be an appropriate remedy in
light of public policy concerns.
b) CCTV and Jurors' Perceptions
Despite the arguments in favor of CCTV, there remains a concern as
to the effect of CCTV on jurors' perceptions of testimony given by wit-
nesses via CCTV. The use of CCTV has most extensively been studied
in cases of child sexual abuse. In Australia, for example, children testi-
fying via CCTV have been perceived by mock jurors to be less distressed
and more consistent in their testimony, in contrast to children testifying
in the courtroom. 152 Despite this fact, mock jurors judge children who
testify via CCTV more negatively. 15 3 Furthermore, studies have re-
vealed that whether testimony is given via CCTV has no significant im-
pact on conviction rates. 15 4 In fact, mock juror studies have shown that
149 See id. at 852.
150 Id. at 851.
151 See H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
152 Judy Cashmore & Lily Trimboli, Child Sexual Assault Trials: A Survey of Juror Per-
ceptions, 102 CRIME & JUST. BULL: NSW BUREAU OF CRIME STAT. AND RES. 1, 2 (2006).
153 Id.
I54 Id.
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jurors are less likely to view a defendant as guilty when the child testifies
via videotape.' 55 These initial results appear to put to bed any concerns
on the part of defense attorneys that their clients may be prejudiced by
the use of CCTV, at least in child sexual assault cases.
Although the majority of research regarding the effects of CCTV on
juror perceptions has focused on child witnesses, a few countries, such as
Australia, allow courts to use CCTV for adult sexual assault victims as
well.' 56 In a mock jury study in Australia, researchers specifically
looked at juror perceptions in cases where the sexual assault victims
were adults.157 In conducting this study, the researchers modified the
transcript of an actual sexual assault trial and had actors portray the
judge, attorneys, victim, and defendant.' 58 The study was designed to
determine whether the mode of testimony (face-to-face versus CCTV)
affected jurors' perceptions of the victim or the defendant.1 59
Ultimately, through the use of pre-deliberation questionnaires, this
mock juror study found a number of factors that influenced jurors' per-
ceptions. The mock jurors reported that the mode in which the adult
victims testified, whether in the courtroom or via CCTV, did not signifi-
cantly impact their perceptions of the victim's credibility.160 Further-
more, the jurors perceived the courtroom procedure as more fair for the
victim when she testified via CCTV.16' Overall, the mock juror study
revealed that the jurors' perceptions of the guilt of the defendants were
not influenced by whether the alleged adult victims testified in the court-
room or via CCTV.16 2 As such, while the use of CCTV for children
tends to bias the jurors against the alleged victim, it has no impact on
how the jurors perceive either the victim or the defendant in adult sexual
assault cases.
However, although there was no difference found in the jurors' per-
ceptions between the use of CCTV or in-court testimony in the mock
juror study, some jurors in the CCTV condition expressed to the re-
searchers that they would have preferred the victim to be physically pre-
sent in the courtroom. 163 Those jurors felt that the use of the CCTV
prevented them from accurately assessing the victim's character, de-
meanor, and truthfulnessl64 -all equally important factors in ensuring
155 Janet K. Swim et al., Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony: Does Protecting
the Child Witness Jeopardize Due Process?, 23 J. op APPLUED Soc. Psycot. 603, 620 (1993).
156 See CCTV Study, supra note 145, at 2.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 24.
159 Id. at 22.
160 Id. at 35.
161 See id. at 36.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 62.
164 Id.
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that a defendant's right to confrontation are not violated by the limita-
tions placed on the proceedings.165 Despite this concern, which tends to
favor defense attorneys' arguments against the use of CCTV, research
has consistently shown that adults are "no more likely to detect truth or
deception when presented with . . . evidence via CCTV compared with
face-to-face testimony."' 66 Furthermore, the fact that the researchers
found no systemic difference in verdict preferences supports the argu-
ment that while jurors may prefer in-court testimony, the mode of testi-
mony does not influence the jury's decision whether to convict the
defendant.16 7
Given the research that has been done in Australia, it is clear that in
cases involving adult sexual assault victims, the use of CCTV in no way
biases jurors against a defendant.16 8 Although the findings may suggest
that there is a preference for in-court testimony, it is not the mode by
which the testimony is given but rather the existence of jurors' pre-ex-
isting beliefs and expectations regarding sexual assault victims that ulti-
mately lead to biases in perceptions.16 9
Indeed, jurors are often biased against victims because of rape
myths-stereotypes of sexual assault victims that shift the blame from
the defendant to the victim.170 A rape myth is a "prejudicial, stereo-
typed, or false belief[ ] about rape, rape victims, and rapists."' 7 ' These
beliefs and attitudes by jurors about what a sexual assault case should
look like and how a sexual assault victim should behave are critical in
understanding jury verdicts in sexual assault cases.17 2 These beliefs-or
rather expectations of how a "real" victim would behave-influence the
perception jurors have of the credibility of the victim,' 73 which ulti-
mately determines whether the jurors will find the defendant guilty.1 74
As such, so long as these myths regarding sexual assault victims exist,
165 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990). The purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure that the witness tells the truth by having the witness give statements under
oath, be cross-examined, and have the jurors observe the demeanor of the witness while she
testifies. Id.
166 CCTV Study, supra note 145, at 62.
167 Id.
168 See id. at 36.
169 Id. at 66.
170 See Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisner, Educating Juries in Sexual Assault Cases
Part I: Using Voir Dire to Eliminate Jury Bias, STRATEGoIES NEwsLicffER (July 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.aequitasresource.org/EducatingJuriesInSexualAssaultCasesPartl.pdf.
171 Sarah Ben-David & Ofra Schneider, Rape Perceptions, Gender Role Attitudes, and
Victim-Perpetrator Acquaintance, 53 SEx ROLEs 385, 385 (2005) (quoting Martha R. Burt,
Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. on PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOi. 217, 217
(1980)).
172 See Natalie Taylor, Juror Attitudes and Biases in Sexual Assault Cases, 344 TRENDS &
ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Juror Attitudes].
173 CCTV Study, supra note 145, at 59.
174 See Juror Attitudes, supra note 172, at 4.
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they will continue to taint jurors' perceptions and thus taint jury verdicts
more so than the use of CCTV testimony will.175
CoNcLusION
Although there are a number of statutes addressing the psychologi-
cal distress that child assault victims face when testifying at trial,176 to
date there have been no statutes regarding adult sexual assault victims.
The proposed Washington legislation would be the first of its kind. It not
only raises the public policy concern of protecting adult sexual assault
victims from further psychological harm, but it also offers methods to
protect those victims while ensuring that the Sixth Amendment rights of
defendants are not unconstitutionally limited. 177
The proposed legislation ensures that the court does not arbitrarily
limit a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by establishing a set of pro-
cedures to follow before restricting a defendant's rights. Furthermore,
the purpose of the proposed legislation is to reduce the trauma that comes
with testifying in court and to encourage more victims of sexual assault
to report their attacks, and the remedy of providing court-appointed
standby counsel supports this public policy. Although standby counsel is
appointed exclusively to cross-examine the victim, this remedy will not
violate a defendant's right to self-representation because the proposed
legislation enacts methods to ensure that the defendant retains control of
his case and uses jury warnings to ensure that jurors perceive the defen-
dant as having remained in control of his case.' 78 However, although
this remedy may meet legal standards, it may in fact negatively impact
jurors' perceptions of defendants. Thus far there has been no research on
jurors' perception of pro se defendants, court-appointed standby counsel,
or the jury instructions given by judges when court-appointed standby
counsel is present. Such research may reveal that the use of court-ap-
pointed standby counsel would lead jurors to perceive a defendant as
more guilty. As such, it is imperative that research be done analyzing the
use of court-appointed standby counsel before it is proposed as a remedy.
Alternatively, the legislation proposes extending the right of CCTV
testimony to adult victims of sexual assault as another potential rem-
edy.17 9 Because there is a strong public policy in favor of protecting
victims from excessive trauma, 1 0 it is likely that the Supreme Court will
uphold the use of CCTV for adult victims. The research conducted on
175 See id. at 4-5.
176 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
177 See H.B. 1001, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
178 See discussion supra Part III.C.I.
179 See H.B. 1001.
180 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
513
514 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:491
jurors' perceptions when adult victims testify via CCTV, however, is
crucial in determining whether the legislation's proposed remedy is ap-
propriate.181 The CCTV studies have revealed that, although jurors may
prefer for victims to testify in court, it has no impact on jurors' percep-
tions of the victim or the defendant.182 As such, the use of CCTV does
not bias jurors against defendants, as many defense attorneys fear. In-
stead, what the research has shown is that jurors' preconceived beliefs
about sexual assault victims continue to impact jurors' perceptions and
decision-making, even when safeguards such as CCTV are employed.183
Thus, while it is unlikely that the proposed remedies under the Washing-
ton legislation will bias jurors against defendants, it is also unlikely that
these remedies will remove the pre-existing biases that jurors have
against victims. It is therefore imperative that steps be taken to educate
jurors about sexual assault in order to reduce the effect of preconceived
beliefs on jurors' perceptions in sexual assault cases.
Some level of discomfort is to be expected when a victim of sexual
assault must testify at trial, but where the defendant has direct access to
his alleged victim it is not unreasonable to expect the victim's level of
distress to become debilitating. Washington's proposed legislation rec-
ognizes the potentially devastating effects pro se defendants can have on
their alleged sexual assault victims and offers a recourse, ensuring that
future victims will continue to come forward without fear of being
badgered by their alleged abusers, while upholding a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights to self-representation and confrontation.
181 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
182 Id.
183 CCTV Study, supra note 145, at 66.
